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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
No. 870177-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN SCHUMANN, 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
against 
DAVID BARBER, 
Defendant, Petitioner. 
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER 
Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to § 78-6-10 
(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986, providing that 
matters heard in the Small Claims Department of the Circuit Court 
may be appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals. This 
appeal comes from a final judgment by the Small Claims Court of 
the Fifth Circuit wherein that Court denied the Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. 
Case Historv 
This appeal comes from a small claims action commenced on 
the 13th day of February 1987, by the Plaintiff Helen Schumann, 
wherein the Defendant David Barber was served on the 21st day of 
February, 1987, On the 4th day of March, 1987, a special appear-
ance was made at the hearing in this matter on behalf of the 
Defendant, who was out of town, to request a two-day continuance 
from the attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small Claims Court. 
This request was denied. 
After denial of a two-day continuance in this matter, the 
attorney-judge pro tempore entered a default judgment against the 
Defendant. 
On the 23rd day of March, 1987, Judge Phillip Palmer, a duly 
appointed Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court, entered an Order 
quashing execution of judgment in this action until such time as 
he could hear the Defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment. Thereafter, on April 16, 1987, Judge Phillip Palmer 
entered an Order relinquishing the Fifth Circuit Court's juris-
diction over this matter and transferring the matter back to the 
Small Claims Department. 
On May 5, 1987, an attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small 
Claims Court denied the Defendant's motion to set aside the 
default judgment. 
This appeal challenges each of the judicial actions listed 
above. 
Constitutional Provisions 
and Statutes Involved 
The text of the following constitutional provisions and 
statutes relevant to the determination of the present case are 
set forth in appendices: U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1; U.S. Const. 
ASmend VI; Utah Const. Art. I § 7; Utah Const. Art. VIII §§5,8 
and 11; § 78-6-1 of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986; § 
78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1981; § 78-6-8 of the 
Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986; § 78-6-10 of the Utah Code Ann., 
as amended 1986. 
Questions Presented 
1. Was the denial of a continuance on the 4th day of 
March, 1987, an abuse of discretion? 
2. Was the Small Claims Court's refusal to allow associate 
counsel to appear as an authorized agent of the Defendant on May 
5, 1987 a violation of § 78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as 
amended 1986? 
3. Was the failure of the Small Claims Court to set aside 
the default judgment an abuse of discretion? 
4. Did the failure of the Fifth Circuit Court to exercise 
supervisory authority over the Small Claims Court deny Defendant 
his rights to due process? 
5. Is § 78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1981, 
void as an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power? 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Defendant, David Earber ("Defendant") was served with 
Plaintiff's Complaint on February 21, 1987. The Defendant's 
business activities are very time consuming, requiring a great 
deal of travel and Defendant was not able to deliver the Com-
plaint to his counsel until ten days later. When counsel was 
contacted by Defendant, counsel was informed by the Defendant 
that he would be out of town on the day of the hearing due to 
business. After reviewing this matter, counsel determined that a 
counterclaim should be filed. Counterclaims, however, must be 
filed at least two (2) days prior to the hearing and counsel was 
not able to meet this deadline. 
2. Counsel for Defendant then contacted the Plaintiff and 
requested a two-day continuance. The Plaintiff refused this 
request. Counsel then contacted the Defendant and agreed to 
appear as an agent for the Defendant at the trial for the sole 
purpose of requesting a continuance from the attorney-judge pro 
tempore assigned to this matter. The attorney-judge pro tempore, 
after expressing uncertainty whether to grant the requested 
continuance and being unfamiliar with regular small claims court 
procedure, then consulted with the court clerk, not a member of 
the Utah Bar. After so doing, the attorney-judge pro tempore 
stated that should her decision prove wrong, the Defendant could 
appeal and, therefore, denied the Defendant's request for a 
continuance. The Defendant, not having time to properly prepare 
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for trial, or to submit his answer and counterclaim to this 
action, and being out of the state on the day of the trial due to 
business, was forced to allow a default to be entered against 
him. 
3. On the 23rd day of March, 1987, counsel for Defendant 
submitted to Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth Circuit Court an 
Ex Parte Motion for an Order Staying Enforcement of the Default 
Judgment until such time as Judge Palmer could hear the Defen-
dant's motion to set aside the default judgment. Judge Phillip 
Palmer granted the Defendant!s Ex Parte Motion. 
4. Thereafter, on the 1st day cf April, 1987, Defendant 
filed his motion to set aside the default judgment on the grounds 
of inadvertence or excusable neglect. On April 16, 1987, repre-
sentatives for Plaintiff and Defendant met with Judge Phillip 
Palmer in his chambers, wherein Judge Palmer stated that the 
Fifth Circuit Court no longer maintained a supervisory position 
over the Small Claims Department and that any action in this 
matter could only be reviewed by an attorney-judge pro tempore of 
the Small Claims Court. Judge Phillip Palmer then entered an 
Order transferring this matter back to the Small Claims Depart-
ment of the Fifth Circuit Court. 
5. On the 5th day of May, 1987, Defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment came on for hearing before an attor-
ney-judge pro tempore. An associate of counsel for Defendant, a 
member of the California State Bar in good standing, appeared as 
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an authorized agent on behalf of the Defendant pursuant to § 
78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986. The attorney-
judge pro tempore, expressed uncertainty as to whether an indi-
vidual could appear through an agent, and not having time to 
review the file or small claims court procedure prior to the 
hearing, refused to allow associate counsel to appear on behalf 
of the Defendant. Associate counsel then requested that the 
Court on its own motion grant a continuance wherein the uncer-
tainty surrounding § 78-6-1(2) could be resolved or alternative 
counsel could appear on behalf of the Defendant. The Court 
refused to do so. The attorney-judge pro tempore, after stating 
that he did not want to become involved in a complex or drawn out 
proceeding and expressing his desire to make a ruling on the 
narrowest grounds possible in order to dispense with the matter, 
ruled that the Defendant had failed to appear and denied the 
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment based upon 
said lack of appearance. On the 11th day of May, 1987, Defendant 
filed his Notice to Appeal. 
Summary of Argument 
The fundamental questions presented by this appeal are (i) 
whether the actions of the Small Claims Court and the Circuit 
Court throughout the entire proceedings were an abuse of dis-
cretion and operated to deny the Defendant his constitutional 
right to due process; (ii) whether an authorized agent may appear 
before the Small Claims Court on behalf of an individual as well 
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as on behalf of a corporation; (iii) is the appointment by the 
Circuit Court of attorney-judges pro tempore to the Small Claims 
Courts of the Circuit Court, which court is a court of record, an 
unconstitutional appointment and delegation of judicial power. 
The actions of the Small Claims Court in denying the Defen-
dant's request for a two-day continuance on May 4, 1987, and the 
subsequent entry of default judgment, in conjunction with the 
refusal of Judge Phillip Palmer to entertain the Defendant's 
motion to set aside the default judgment on March 23, 1987, and 
the transfer of this matter back to the small claims department, 
and the refusal on the 5th day of May, 1987, to allow an 
associate of counsel for Defendant to appear as an authorized 
agent, or to grant a continuance on the Court's own motion 
whereby questions surrounding this matter or alternative counsel 
could appear for Defendant and the Court's failure to set aside 
the default judgment were all abuses of discretion and operated 
to deny the Defendant his constitutional rights of due process. 
Section 78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986, 
specifically allows for persons as well as corporations to appear 
through authorized employees. The refusal of the Small Claims 
Court on May 5, 1987, to allow an associate of counsel for Defen-
dant to appear as an authorized agent on behalf of Defendant 
pursuant to § 78-6-1(2), in order to present the Defendant's 
motion to set aside the default judgment is in direct contra-
diction with § 78-1-6-1(2) and hence, the Small Claims Court's 
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denial of the Defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment, based solely upon the Defendant!s lack of personal 
appearance, is in error and should be reversed by this Court, 
By 1986 amendment to the Utah Judicial Code, § 78-6-8 of the 
Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986, the small claims courts of the 
circuit courts are courts of record. The Utah Constitution 
Article VIII §§8 and 11, flatly require that judges pro tempore 
to courts of record be appointed either by the governor or chief 
justice of the supreme court or by special rule of the Supreme 
Court. Judges pro tempore of small claims courts within the 
circuit court are presently appointed by the Circuit Court, 
according to statute, § 78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann., as 
amended 1981, and hence their appointment is a direct: violation 
of Art. VIII §§8 and 11 of the Utah Constitution and, therefore, 
such appointments are unconstitutional and without force. 
The denial of the Defendant's constitutional rights of due 
process by an array of abuses by the lower courts, and the 
unconstitutional appointment of attorney-judges pro Cempore to 
the Small Claims Court requires that the Defendant's motion to 
set aside the default judgment be granted so that he may be heard 
in this matter and that he be allowed to submit his answer and 
counterclaim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Denial of a Two-Day Continuance 
Was an Abuse of Discretion 
Due to the Defendant's being out of town on the day set for 
trial, and because of the Defendant's lack of time to properly 
prepare a defense in this matter, or to submit his counterclaim, 
an associate of counsel for Defendant appeared before the small 
claims judge pro tempore on the day and time set for trial for 
the sole purpose of requesting a two-day continuance in this 
matter. 
The attorney-judge pro tempore denied this request. In so 
doing, the attorney-judge pro tempore stated that she was uncer-
tain as to whether such a continuance could be granted by the 
small claims court, and after consulting with the court clerk, 
not a member of the Utah Bar, she stated that should her denial 
of a continuance prove wrong, the Defendant could always appeal. 
The denial of a two-day continuance is a clear abuse of dis-
cretion. As the Utah Supreme Court so succinctly stated in 
Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 369, 371 
(Utah 1980): 
The uniform acknowledged policy of the 
law is to accord litigants the opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits, where that can 
be done without serious injustice to the 
other party. 
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The granting of a two-day continuance would have accorded 
the Defendant his constitutional right to present evidence and 
confront witnesses. U.S. Const. Amend VI. 
A two-day continuance in this matter would not have caused 
injustice, nor would it have prejudiced the rights of the Plain-
tiff. Its denial, however, resulted in the entry of a default 
judgment against the Defendant and substantially prejudiced his 
rights in this matter. Hence, the denial of a continuance by the 
attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small Claims Court was a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
II. 
An Individual Defendant May Appear in 
Small Claims Court Through an Authorized Agent 
Section 78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986, 
reads: 
Persons or corporations may litigate 
actions on behalf of themselves in person or 
through authorized employees with or without 
counsel. [Emphasis addedj. 
On May 5, 1987, an associate of counsel for Defendant, a 
member of the California State Bar in good standing, appeared as 
an authorized agent on behalf of the Defendant pursuant to 
§ 78-6-1(2), in order to present Defendant's motion to set aside 
the default judgment. 
The attorney-judge pro tempore presiding over this hearing 
stated that he was not familiar with § 78-6-1(2), as amended in 
1986, and was uncertain as to whether an individual as well as a 
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corporation could appear through an authorized agent. After 
reviewing § 78-6-1(2), the attorney-judge pro tempore ruled that 
an individual could not appear through an authorized agent, and 
that §78-6-1(2) provided only for corporations to appear through 
an authorized employee. The attorney-judge pro tempore then 
refused to hear arguments in this matter and ruled that the 
Defendant had failed to appear and, hence, denied the Defendant's 
motion to set aside the default judgment based upon said lack of 
personal appearance by the Defendant. 
The attorney-judge pro tempore1s ruling flies directly in 
the face of § 78-6-1(2), as amended, which specifically states 
persons, or corporations may litigate on behalf of themselves in 
person or through an authorized agent. The attorney-judge pro 
temporeT s interpretation of § 78-6-1(2) is in error, and hence, 
the attorney-judge pro tempore1s ruling denying the Defendant's 
motion to set aside the default judgment based upon Defendant's 
lack of personal appearance must be overturned as in direct 
violation of § 78-6-1(2). 
III. 
The Refusal of the Small Claims Court to Allow the 
Defendant to Present His Motion to Set Aside the""" 
Default Judgment and Its Failure to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment Were an Abuse of Discretion 
On the 5th day of May, 1987, Defendant's motion to set aside 
the default judgment came on for hearing before an attorney-judge 
pro tempore of the Small Claims Court. Because the Small Claims 
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Court refused to allow Defendant to appear through an authorized 
agent, and would not on its own motion grant a continuance 
wherein uncertainty surrounding representation by an authorized 
agent could be resolved or alternative counsel could appear on 
behalf of the Defendant, the Small Claims Court denied the 
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment based solely 
upon the Defendant's lack of personal appearance. The refusal by 
the Small Claims Court to grant a continuance whereby the Defen-
dant would be allowed to present his motion to set aside the 
default judgment and the Court's failure to set aside the default 
are a clear abuse of discretion. 
In Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 269, 
371 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court in vacating the judgment 
of the lower court, which court had refused to set aside the 
default judgment, stated: 
However, they (default judgments) are 
not favored in law, especially where a party 
has timely responded with challenging plead-
ings. . . . 
The Court went on to state in dicta: 
...it is to be kept in mind that access to 
the courts for the protection of rights and 
the settlement of disputes is one of the most 
important factors in the maintenance of a 
peaceable and well-order* d society.... To 
that end, the courts are generally indulgent 
toward setting aside of default judgments. 
Id. at 371. 
In the following this policy, the Court held: 
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Consistent with the objective just stated 
where there is doubt about whether a default 
should be set aside, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of doing so, to the end 
that each party may have an opportunity to 
present his side of the controversy and that 
there be a resolution in accordance with law 
and justice. 
Id. at 371. 
The Supreme Court then vacated the lower court's order and 
remanded the matter back to the lower court for a hearing on the 
merits. 
The refusal of the attorney-judge pro tempore to grant a 
continuance on the Court's own motion in order to assure that the 
Defendant could be heard and the Court's failure to set aside the 
default judgment are in direct contradiction to the stated policy 
of the law as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Interstate 
Excavating, supra, to allow all litigants the right to be heard 
in accordance with law and justice and to resolve all doubts in 
favor of the setting aside of default judgments. Hence, the 
ruling of the Small Claims Court is a clear abuse of discretion 
and should be set aside, in order that the Defendant may be heard 
in this matter. 
IV. 
Section 78-6-1.5 of Utah Code Anr ^ 
Is an Unconstitutional Delegation of Judicial Power 
Section 78-6-1.5 reads in pertinent part: 
If at any time public necessity and 
convenience will be better served by making 
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the small claims court available during 
evening hours in addition to day-time set-
tings, the circuit court may enter an order 
appointing a member or members of the UtafiT 
State Bar in good standing, with the members 
consent, as small claims court judge(s) pro 
tempore^ who after being duly sworn, shall 
serve voluntarily and without compensation at 
the request of the court, shall be extended 
the same immunities and shall have the same 
powers with respect to matters within the 
jurisdiction of the small claims court as may 
be exercised by dul}^  elected circuit judges. 
[Emphasis added] . 
Article VIII § 8 of the Utah Constitution states: 
Judges of courts not of record shall be 
selected in a manner, for a term, and with 
qualifications provided by statute. [Emphasis 
added]. 
However, Article VIII § 11 of the Utah Constitution states 
in relevant part: 
When a vacancy occurs on a court of 
record, the governor shall fill the vacancy 
by appointment .... If the governor fails to 
fill the vacancy within the time prescribed, 
the chief justice of the supreme court shall 
. . . make the appointment. . . . The senate 
shall consider and render a decision in each 
judicial appointment within 30 days of the 
date of appointment.... [Emphasis added]. 
Article VIII § 4 of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the supreme court by rule may 
authorize retired justices and judges and 
judges pro tempore to perform any judicial 
duties.... [Emphasis added]. 
Hence, prior to § 78-6-8 of the Utah Code Ann. as amended in 
1986, judges pro tempore of the small claims courts, which court 
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was not a court of record, could be appointed as provided by 
statute. Utah Const. Art. VIII § 11. However, by 1986 amendment 
to the Utah Code, § 78-6-8 of the Utah Code, as amended 1986, the 
small claims courts of the circuit court became courts of record, 
hence, the appointment of any judge pro tempore to the small 
claims court of the circuit court, after January 1986, can only 
be by appointment of the governor or chief justice of the supreme 
court with senate confirmation or as authorized by special rule 
of the supreme court. Utah Const. Art. VIII §§4 and 11. 
Hence, the present appointment of judges pro tempore by the 
circuit court as provided by statute, § 78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code 
as amended 1981, is in direct contradiction with Article VIII 
§§4 and 11 and, therefore, these appointments are unconstitu-
tional and without validity. Consequently, any decision rendered 
by a judge pro tempore of the small claims court so appointed is 
without binding force in law or fact. 
V. 
Failure of the Fifth Circuit Court to Exercise 
Supervisory Authority over The Small Claims Court 
Denied Defendant His Constitutional Rights to 
Due Process and is in Contradiction to 
§ 78-6-1 of Utah Code Ann." 
On April 16, 1987, representatives for Plaintiff and Defen-
dant appeared before Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth Circuit 
Court to have the Defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment heard, which default judgment has previously been 
entered by the Small Claims Court of the Fifth Circuit Court 
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after that Court refused to grant Defendant's two-day continuance 
to respond in this matter. Judge Phillip Palmer refused to 
entertain the Defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment and entered an Order relinquishing jurisdiction of the 
Fifth Circuit Court and transferring the matter back to the Small 
Claims Department. At the time of entering this Order, Judge 
Palmer stated in his chambers to representatives of the Plaintiff 
and Defendant that the Fifth Circuit Court no longer maintained a 
supervisory position over the Small Claims Department of the 
Fifth Circuit Court, and that any action in this matter could 
only be reviewed by an attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small 
Claims Court. 
Section 78-6-1 of the Utah Code Ann. as amended 1986, 
provides: 
There is created in the circuit courts 
and justice's courts of this state, a depart-
ment known as the "Small Claims Court", which 
has jurisdiction, but not exclusive, in 
cases: 
(a) for the recovery of money where the 
amount claimed does not exceed $1,000 
and where the defendant resides or the 
action of indebtedness was incurred in 
the jurisdiction of the court in which 
the action is maintained; ... [emphasis 
added]. 
The refusal by Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth Circuit 
Court to exercise any supervisory authority over the attorney-
judges pro tempore of the Small Claims Court, a department within 
the Circuit Court, who exercise their position without election 
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or official appointment and who generally have no prior judicial 
experience in this area, which position is purely part-time and 
noncompensator}', § 78-6-1 of the Utah Code Ann. as amended 1986, 
is a violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights to due 
process of the law. Such a position by the Fifth Circuit Court, 
if allowed to persist, would result in a Small Claims Department 
of the Circuit Court whose behavior and decisions are totally 
unchecked and without supervision. This argument is supported by 
the fact that by 1986 amendment to the Code, see § 78-6-10(2) of 
the Utah Code Ann. as amended 1986, a trial de novo is no longer 
available to defendants in matters heard in the small claims 
department of the circuit courts, and the sole recourse from any 
decision rendered by a small claims court is appellate review by 
this Court, the filing fees and bond costs of which are approx-
imately $500.00. 
The Defendant has the constitutional right to have the law 
as applied to him administered in a manner that will safeguard 
and protect his individual rights, and to have the course of 
legal proceedings occur in that manner established by our system 
of jurisprudence for the regular enforcement and protection of an 
individual's rights. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1; Ut. Const. 
Art. 1 § 7. The refusal by Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth 
Circuit Court to exercise authority over the Small Claims Court, 
a department of the Fifth Circuit, which court does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction and is presided over solely by attorney-
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judges pro tempore who do not have sufficient time to properly 
prepare for matters presented and often lack sufficient experi-
ence in administering the law, violated the constitutional due 
process rights of the Defendant to have his motion heard by a 
duly appointed and elected judge of the Circuit Court in order to 
assure a fair and reasonable trial on the merits (U.S. Const. 
Amend. VI), and to have his claims heard in that manner provided 
by law for the regular enforcement and protection of his rights. 
Conclusion 
For all the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully 
requests that the default judgment in this matter be set aside, 
in order that this matter may be decided on the merits, and that 
Petitioner be allowed to present his answer and counterclaim in 
this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tht&^-V a^fr of August, 1987. tl&^—/ "xjqfy of 
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CERTIFICATE OF M A I L W / 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j/Lf ^ay of August, 1987, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Appellant's 
Brief" by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Helen Schumann 
3782 South 20th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8A109 
_??_ 
Appendix A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
o o 
Appendix B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Amendment XIV 
Section ] 
All persons born or naturalized i n the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States nd of the State wherein they reside No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or ininn r-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, II berty, or property, without di le 
process of law; nor deny to any person within I ts jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the 3 aws, 
Appendix C 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Art. 1 Sec. 7 [Due process of law]. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
-?S-
Appendix F 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Art. VIII 
Sec, 4. [Rule-making power of supreme court - Jude?~ ~r^ tempore 
- R e gti 1 a 11 on o f pr a c t i c e o f 1 aw ] 
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The legislature may amend the 
rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the supreme court upon 
a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constituti on, 
the supreme court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah 
residents, and admitted to practice law in I Jtah, The supreme 
court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law 
-?fi-
Appendix E 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Art, VIII 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts - Right 
of appeal]. 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and 
power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The juris-
diction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall 
be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with 
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right 
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. 
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Appendix F 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec 8 (Vacancies - 'Nominatii ig commissioi is Senate approva 1 "l 
\ Illen a vacancy occnrs i n a cour t of record , the grverrrr 
shall fill the vacancy by appoi ntment from a list of at least 
three nominees certified to the governor by the judicial nominat-
ing commission having authority over the vacancy. The governor 
shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of 
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy within the 
time prescribed, the chief justice of the supreme court shall 
within 20 days make the appointment from,, the li st of nominees. 
The legislature by statute shall provide for the nominating 
commissions1 composition and procedures. No member of the 
legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the legislature 
appoint members to, any judicial nominating commission. The 
senate shal 1 consider and render a decision on each judicial 
appointment within 30 days of the date of appointment. If 
necessary, the senate shall convene Itself in extraordinary 
sessions for the purpose of considering judicial appointments. 
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a majority of 
all members of the senate. If the senate fails to approve the 
appointment, the office shall be considered, vacant and a new 
irinating process shal ] commence. Selection of judges shall be 
based solely upon consideration of fitness for office without 
regard to any partisan pc 1: *-1 c i \ cons 1 dera t•? rms . 
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Appendix G 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Art. VIII 
Sec. 11. [Judges of courts not of record]. 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a 
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided by statute. 
However, no qualification may be imposed which requires judges of 
courts not of record to be admitted to practice law. The number 
of judges of courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 
_9Q_ 
Appendix. H 
UTAH JUDICIAL CODE 
78-6-1"! Creation - Jurisdiction - Coi msel not necessary 
DeferrI ng mu 11i p 1 e c 1 a 1 ms of one p 1 a 1 n11 f f. 
(] ) There is created in the circuit courts and justice's 
i: 1: .s of this state, a department known as the "SMALL CLAIMS 
RT," which has jurisdiction, but' not exclusive, in cases: 
(a) for the i eco vex y of money where the amount claimed 
does not exceed $1,000 and where the defendant resides or the 
••. "ion of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction of 
th*. -ourt i n whi ch the actl on 1 s to be man ntained; or 
("fa) 1 nvolving interpleader under Rule 22 of the I Itah 
i uivil Procedure, in which the amount claimed does not 
cAuecii "u'p- Jurisdiction of the court, 
( J. ) Persons or corporations may litigate actions on behalf 
o f t h ems e 1 ve s in p er s on or thr oi igh ai i th or i z e d emp 1 o y e e s wi th or 
wi *rhou t c oun s e 1 
(3) If a person or corporation files TIIUI tiple claims in ai n 
one small claims court, the clerk of judge of the court may 
i amove all but the initial claim from, the court's calendar in 
or der to dispose of all other small claims court matters. Clad ms 
so removed shall be rescheduled as permitted by the court's 
calendar. _ • 
78-6-1 , 5 Evend ng hours - Speci al ly appoi nted judges pro-tempore. 
I f a t ai ly t ime pub lie ne c e s s i t y ai id c on v en i en c e wi 11 b e 
better served by making the small clai ms court available during 
=
 r
 sning hours in addition to day-time settings, the circuit court 
i: i ay enter an order appointing a member or members of the Utah 
St ate Bar in good standing, with the member's consent, as small 
claims court judge(s) pro-tempore to hear and. determine those 
small claims at tim.es to be set by the court. Such specially 
aj: poi nted small claims court judge) s ) pro-tempore, after being 
duly sworn, shall serve voluntarily and 'without compensation at 
the request of the court, shall be extended the same immunities, 
and shall have the same powers wi th respect to matters within the 
jurisdiction of the -mall claims court as may be exercised by 
du 1 y e 1 e c t e d c ir cu i t ; *;.J ? e«;. 
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Appendix I 
UTAH JUDICIAL CODE 
78-6-8. Pleadings and hearings informal, exception - Attachment, 
garnishment, and execution may issue. 
No formal pleading, other than the affidavit and notice, is 
necessary, and the hearing and disposition of the actions may be 
informal, except that the circuit court shall maintain the 
proceeding on the record as in any other case, with the sole 
object of dispensing speedy justice between the parties. Attach-
ment, garnishment, and execution may issue after judgment in the 
manner prescribed by law upon the payment of the fees allowed by 
law for those services. 
- ^ i . 
Appendix J 
UTAH JUDICIAL CODE 
78-6-1 P Smal 1 claim- - When conclusi ^  re Exception • -ppeal 
A t t c — u - ' ••• p--
(1 ) The j udgment o f the sma 11 c 1 a ims dep artment o f r r e~ 
justices 1 and circuit court is conclusi .ve upon the nl ai r-ri;"-
unless a counterclaim has been interposed 
(2) I f t h e in a 11 e r is heard in t h e s m a 11 c 1 a iiii s i = p = r t m e n t o f 
the circuit court, the defendant may appeal the ]n .dgmei it of the 
circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of 
appeal wi thi n f 1 ve days of the entry of the j udgment against him. 
(3) If the matter is heard in the smal 1 claims department of 
the justices1 court, the defendant may obtain a trial de novo in 
the circuit court by filing in the circuit court of the county a 
petition for trial de novo within five days of the entry of the 
j udgment against h im. 
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